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1. INTRODUCTION 
Elucidating a clear connection between economic growth and income inequality is arguably one 
of the most important economic questions of our day. There was much interest in income inequality 
in developing countries in the 1960s that diminished as these countries were faced with more pressing 
issues including declining growth rates and debt problems (Gillis, 1992). With increasing financial 
globalization and recent important sociopolitical developments, the relevance of the question is 
experiencing a resurgence that is not likely to diminish in the future. A probable endogeneity in the 
relationship, exacerbated by pronounced identification issues and numerous measurement concerns, 
raises the difficulty of attaining an incontrovertible answer. Consequently, there is neither a 
theoretical consensus, nor consistent empirical evidence that would lead to the conclusion of a strong, 
or weak, relationship that is positive or negative.  
In seminal work, Kuznets (1955) showed that since the beginning of the 19th century, the process 
of economic growth had reduced income inequality in most countries by increasing per capita 
income, which came hand-in-hand with labor movements from the agricultural to industrial sectors. 
He showed that the process led to a gradual increase in income inequality at the early stages of 
development, and as economic growth continued, it gradually led to reductions in income 
inequality—the famous Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped curve. 
Since Kuznets, an abundance of theoretical models have been advanced. However, many of the 
competing theories have offsetting effects leading to an ambiguous net effect of inequality on 
economic growth. Empirical lessons are not much better as they tend not to be robust. For example, 
Benabou (1996) and Perotti (1996), among others, find increases in inequality tend to be associated 
with lower economic growth, whereas Forbes (2000) predicts the opposite. 
Many of these competing theories may be classified under three broad categories: i) socio-
political, ii) savings rates and tech spillovers, and iii) credit-market asymmetries— the one this paper 
operates in. 
Income inequality may have some sociopolitical implications if it serves to incentivize behaviors 
that are disruptive to economic activity such as crime, political instability, and revolution—thus, these 
might lead income inequality to detract from economic growth. Insofar as political unrest might lead 
to revolution, or the toppling of regimes, governments might engage in some redistribution of 
resources from the rich to the poor [see Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), among others] in order to mitigate the possibility of regime change. If a greater 
degree of inequality leads to greater redistribution for political purposes, and this redistribution 
generates more distortions [See Barro (2000) for explanations of tax distortions from financing 
transfer payments or corporate taxes or taxes on labor income that discourage investment and labor 
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supply] it may lead to reductions in economic growth. However, if higher income inequality 
incentivized the type of redistribution that served to allocate idle resources from the rich to poorer 
(but more productive) agents, then this redistribution could generate a positive relationship between 
higher inequality and economic growth.  
There is some mixed evidence that low-income individuals tend to have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume than high-income individuals. If that is the case, then a redistribution from 
high-income to low-income individuals might serve to lower the aggregate saving rate in the 
economy. Thus, a rise in income inequality might lead to higher levels of domestic investment that 
would foster economic growth. Another avenue for this mechanism is that of technological advances. 
If technological improvements serve to reduce setup costs for investment (e.g., reductions in price of 
computing reduce barriers to entry in computing-intensive activities) and this leads to higher 
investment by lower-income agents (with lower individual saving rates) then this could induce a 
positive relationship between higher degrees of income inequality and economic growth. 
Finally, in an economy with credit market asymmetries, credit avenues may not be widely open to 
both high- and low-income individuals. With limited access to capital markets, the undertaking of 
investment opportunities will depend, to some degree, on individual holdings of assets and levels of 
income. In an economy where credit is highly constrained to wealthy individuals, a redistribution of 
assets and income from the 'idle rich' to the 'productive poor' might raise the average productivity of 
investment. In this case a reduction in inequality might foster higher economic growth. On the other 
hand, in an economy where productivity gains require high levels of human capital, investment 
requires steep setup costs, or firms' profitability is only sustainable beyond a certain size of company, 
then—with limited access to capital markets—any of these factors present clear advantages to agents 
with high income or a high concentration of assets. In this case higher income inequality might favor 
economic growth. 
As the next section highlights, much of the empirical literature on the relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth focuses either on purely developed economies or on large 
panels with a larger share of developed than developing economies. Two important examples are 
Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000). In this paper, we focus exclusively on developing economies as 
characterized by the World Bank. This encompasses a vast swath of countries (we consider 111). 
Thus, we classify these economies as high-income developing countries (HIDCs) and low-income 
developing countries (LIDCs)—according to both the World's Bank classification as well as our own 
classification based on an income threshold that is endogenously estimated by our model. Because, a 
priori, there may be wide differences across the two groups of countries in terms of institutions, 
openness in capital markets, aversion to redistribution policies, culture etc., it is possible for this 
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relationship (between income inequality and economic growth) to differ across income groups. The 
central thesis of this paper is that firms in HIDC economies may enjoy higher levels of collateral, and 
therefore more robust access to capital markets, than companies in LIDC economies, which may be 
faced with more constrained access to credit markets.  
As a preview of our results, we find that the relationship between inequality and growth seems 
significantly positive for HIDC and significantly negative for LIDC. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief outline of the empirical findings in the literature. 
Section 3 advances a brief theoretical illustration in which the relationship can be sensitive to income 
thresholds as functions of the availability of collateral. Section 4 presents various empirical 
applications and discusses results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
A clear empirical relationship between income inequality and economic growth remains elusive. 
Difficulties stem from: i) the evident endogeneity issue, ii) lack of reliable data, and iii) sensitivity to 
different econometric approaches. 
Analysis of this kind begs the question of whether economic growth responds to changes in 
income inequality or whether income inequality responds to economic growth (in any direction). For 
the latter, this suggests placing income inequality as the dependent variable in the regression and 
placing some measure of economic activity, or growth, as the explanatory variable on the right-hand 
side [see Partridge (1997) and Fawaz et al. (2012) for two such examples of this approach]. However, 
the former question—which involves considering economic growth as the dependent variable on the 
left-hand side and income inequality as a regressor—is possibly much more popular, and it is the 
approach we take here.  
Benabou (2000) provides a comprehensive review of studies of this question, most of which 
relied on cross-sectional analysis of cross-country data that differed greatly in terms of quality. The 
influential work of Deininger and Squire (1996), who compiled a more comprehensive international 
dataset on income inequality (the Gini measure), is widely regarded as an important quality 
improvement in the data. Their database allows for more straightforward cross-county comparisons in 
inequality.  
The sign in the relationship between inequality and economic growth seems sensitive to different 
econometric methodologies. Various applications of the ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology 
typically find a negative relationship between income inequality and growth. For example, Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) interpret a higher relative position of the middle quintile of income as a higher 
degree of income inequality and find it to be correlated with higher mean annual growth rates over the 
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1960-1985 period for a cross-section of countries. Another notable example is Alesina and Rodrick 
(1994) who, over the same period, find a negative relationship between Deininger and Squire's Gini 
coefficient of inequality and economic growth for a different cross-country sample. Along with 
Perotti (1993), these papers find a negative relationship to be motivated by the redistribution 
mechanism explained earlier. Galor and Zeira (1993) also find that reducing wealth inequality can 
promote economic growth, but the mechanism they employ there is one that advances credit 
constraints as the possible explanation.  
With the advent of the Gini measure, which enables estimation of more complete or higher 
quality panels, other authors relied on a fixed effects (FE) econometric approach, arguing that OLS 
estimates may be biased by omitted country-specific effects. In addition, OLS regressions generally 
contemplate inequality at long lags by starting at an early date of economic growth, around 1960, and 
projecting it onto the next 25 years. FE models typically consider shorter lags of five-year periods. 
Generally this econometric approach results in a positive relationship between inequality and 
economic growth. Two notable examples are Galor and Tsidon (1997) and Forbes (2000). The former 
argue that in the presence of sustained technological improvements high-skilled labor tends to 
concentrate in high-tech industries, which may deepen income inequality while fostering economic 
growth. The latter controls for time-invariant country-specific effects to reduce a potential source of 
omitted variable bias. 
Finally, Quah (2001) and Panizza (2002) find little or no stable relationship between inequality 
and economic growth. With another methodology based on a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimator procedure, Barro (2000) also finds no clear relationship between inequality and growth. 
However, by employing the usual sample of rich countries, typically used in other  FE models, and 
augmenting it with a sizeable number of poorer countries, he finds a different relationship between 
the poor countries and the rich countries. 
A possible explanation for the ambiguity in the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth and its sensitivity to various econometric techniques is that the relationship could 
be nonlinear. For example, estimates in Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) are consistent with a different 
relationship at short horizons than at long ones. Overall, the different results could stem from attempts 
to extract different structural explanations from the same reduced form evidence—a point 
persuasively made by Banerjee and Duflo (2003).    
In this paper we focus on developing economies, where the relevance of the question is likely to 
remain high in the coming years. We explore the possibility of nonlinearity in the inequality-growth 
relationship in developing economies as a function of income distribution of these countries. Our 
search in this paper operates on the last of the three broad mechanisms of the literature that we raised 
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in the introduction—namely, credit market asymmetries. Our hypothesis is one of limited 
accessibility to credit markets for developing countries below a certain threshold of income. In the 
next section, we provide a brief theoretical illustration to motivate subsampling developing 
economies into HIDCs and LIDCs and allow the correlation to be different across the two income 
groups. 
 
3. COLLATERAL, INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
 
In the presence of diminishing marginal product of capital, economic growth can be fostered in 
economies that enjoy robust markets where the owners of the factors of production and the users of 
those factors can meet. For some degree of inequality, private investment can be enhanced when 
those agents with a lot of assets (perhaps not fully employed to capacity) can lend them to poorer, but 
more productive, agents. Thus, in the face of inequality, robust capital markets facilitate such 
transactions, which can be growth-enhancing. Credit constraints present an impediment to this 
process and, therefore, can have a deleterious effect on growth.  
We present a similar theoretical model to Benabou (1996) and we augment it to consider two 
economies—one high-income and one low-income. We begin with two fairly innocuous assumptions: 
One, the 'grease' that facilitates credit transactions is the availability of collateral (denoted byϕ ). 
Two, the availability of collateral will be generally higher in higher-income countries than in lower-
income countries (CP).  
Take a high-income and a low-income developing economy. The high-income economy is 
classified as such because its national income is above some threshold aggregate level of income ( )Y . 
The national income for the low-income economy is below that Y threshold. Each economy is 
populated with N-many arbitrary number of firms. Firm j owns 0, jk initial units capital at the 
beginning of period t and produces according to the following technology 
 0 1j jy Ak
α
α< <=  (3.1) 
where jk is the amount of capital firm j employs and, because of knowledge spillovers, the factor 
productivity ( )A  for firm j depends on the aggregate level of capital stock that accumulates according 
to  
 1t t t tK K sY Kδ+ − = −  (3.2) 
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where s  and δ denote the exogenous saving and depreciation rates, respectively, and  tY  is the 
aggregate level of output, or income, in the economy at period t  that is derived from aggregating all 
production across the N firms 1
N
t j
j
Y y
=
 
= 
 
∑
  . 
Let ϕ denote the available level of collateral a given firm j might be endowed with. We assume 
that this collateral is a function of the income that the company generates as follows 
 jyϕ µ=  (3.3) 
where 0µ >  denotes the share of income the firm desires to hold as collateral to leverage future 
loans. Thus, collateral is assumed to be a positive and increasing function of income for the firm. 
However, we do not assume that function to be smooth. In other words, we assume that collateral 
tends to dry up quickly for firms that underperform. Thus, we assume 
10
0 . .
jif y YN
o w
ϕ
> ≥

=

 
In the aggregate, our assumption implies that for countries with a large share of the N firms 
producing below the average threshold level of income 1 Y
N
 
 
 

, it is more likely that the aggregate 
level of income is below the threshold. The availability of collateral in such a LIDC may be greatly 
reduced. The converse, then, suggests that countries with income above this threshold (HIDCs) may 
be endowed with higher levels of collateral and, thus, better access to capital markets. 
 Thus, an agent can employ more ( )jk  capital than it owns 0,( )jk  by borrowing at the beginning 
of the period but only if it has collateral ( 0)ϕ > . In the absence of collateral, the firm can either 
employ as much capital as it owns 0,( )j jk k= , or employ less 0,( )j jk k< and lend the difference to 
collect a market rate ( 0r > ).  
Thus, firm j solves the following problem  
 0,( )
j
j j jk
Max Ak r k kα ϕ− − −  (3.4) 
by finding an optimal level of capital that maximizes its income net of its cost of borrowing. If 
the firm had no collateral ( 0)ϕ = and it were to be more representative of firms in a LIDC country 
where ( tY Y<  ), then it is straightforward to find that the optimal level of capital for firm j is an 
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increasing function of factor productivity and capital share of output and a decreasing function of the 
cost of borrowing. Thus, yielding the following solution 
 
1
1
*
j
Ak
r
αα − 
=  
 
 (3.5) 
If the aggregate level of capital is composed of the sum-total of all firms' capital stock 
1
N
t j
j
K k
=
= ∑  and each firm concluded (3.5) was its optimal level of capital and chose to employ that 
level of capital, it is trivial to show the aggregate level of income for that country would be consistent 
with Frankel (1962) standard AK model (where t tY AK= with A denoting total factor productivity). 
Combining this with (3.2), it is also quite tractable to conclude that along the balanced growth path, 
output would grow at the same rate as the aggregate capital stock so that  
 1t ty k
t
K Kg g sA
K
δ+
−
= ≡ = −  (3.6) 
Benabou (1996) shows that in the event of no borrowing by any firm in the economy, output 
would grow at a slower rate than (3.6). 
On the other hand, if a firm j had collateral ( 0)ϕ > and it were to be more representative of firms 
in a HIDC where ( tY Y>  ), then solving the firm's problem (3.4) along with the definition of 
collateral (3.3) would yield the following solution 
 
( )
1
1
** 1
j
r A
k
r
αµ α − +
=  
 
 (3.7) 
Inspecting (3.7) in comparison with (3.5)—and given that both 0r > and 0µ > by 
construction— reveals that ** *j jk k> the optimal level of capital in a market with more collateral (less 
constrained credit market) is higher than the level of capital in a market with less collateral (more 
constrained credit markets). Optimal condition (3.7) suggests that the optimal level of capital **jk for 
firm j is an increasing function of the desired level of collateralµ . Thus, higher levels of collateral 
(or less constrained credit markets) may lead to faster accumulation of capital and therefore be 
conducive to higher economic growth. This suggests that income inequality in HIDC economies with 
generally higher levels of collateral could be consistent with higher economic growth—whereas the 
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relationship between income inequality and economic growth in LIDCs, typically with lower levels of 
collateral, might go in the other direction. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
We undertake a number of approaches to study whether income inequality promotes (or detracts 
from) economic growth for a large panel of developing countries classified as either high-income or 
low-income. Our hypothesis is that the impact of income inequality on economic growth is a function 
of the availability of collateral—and that, in turn, varies with national income. Thus, we follow the 
World Bank (2012) classification of developing countries into LIDCs and HIDCs. However, it could 
be argued that this classification—as established by the World Bank—could be considered somewhat 
arbitrary.2
We employ annual data from 1960 to 2010 on 111 countries from the World Development 
Indicator (WDI) database of the World Bank (2010).
 Thus, our final approach is to consider a threshold model and let our sample determine 
endogenously whether there is a natural cutoff point in income across these countries to distinguish 
between HIDC and LIDC. We conduct our analysis with an FE model, as well as a dynamic panel 
approach where we regress our endogenous variable—economic growth—on various measures  used 
by Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) encompassing income inequality, industrial prices, and human 
capital formation. 
3
ty
 The variables we select are commonly used in 
empirical studies of inequality and economic growth. These variables are employed by Forbes (2000), 
who in turn picks these variables following the work of Perotti (1996), which she characterizes as "his 
definitive study finding a negative effect of inequality on growth" (p.872). Our dependent variable       
( ) is annual percentage change in per capita gross national product (GNP) at constant 2005 
purchase power parity (PPP) prices.4 We include the Gini coefficient in our set of regressors as our 
measure of income inequality—an updated version of the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset from 
the World Bank (2010).5
                                                 
2 The World Bank issued the first World Development Report in 1978. Their classification of developing countries has 
changed over time. For instance, in 1978 they subclassify these countries between "low" and "middle income" 
countries. The installment we use in this paper (WDR 2012) divides developing countries into "low" and "high" 
income. The benchmark criteria has also changed. For example, in 1978 the benchmark was based in per capita GNP 
(US$250) whereas in 2012 the benchmark was based in Gross National Income (US$1,035). 
 We include net male (Msch) and net female (Fsch) enrollment ratios. These 
3 Given that, for many countries, this data set does not contain schooling information before 1970, the closest 
comparable variable from Barro and Lee (1993) is selected for the period of 1960-1969. 
4 An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the 
sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of 
output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. 
5 The Gini coefficient assumes a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (everyone has the 
same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (one person has all the income and everybody else has zero 
income). 
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measure the number of students of official school age who are enrolled in primary school as a share 
of the total population of children who fall in the corresponding official school age group. We employ 
the PPP ratio of investment divided by the exchange rate relative to the United States (PPPI) from the 
Penn World Tables 6.1. This variable is commonly used in the open economy literature to proxy for 
market distortions that affect the cost of investment (see Forbes 2000). 
 
4.1 Benchmark Model 
 Our sample covers annual data on several macroeconomic aggregates in 55 countries 
classified as LIDC according to the World Bank, and 56 countries classified as HIDC from 1960 
to 2010 (the names of the countries sampled are provided in Tables 1 and 2).  
[INSERT TABLES 1 & 2 HERE] 
As a first step, we draw inferences on the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth in developing countries by considering a standard model in the literature (see Barro 2000, 
Forbes 2000, Caselli et al. 1996, Perotti 1996, among others) 
 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1it i it it it it it ity G y Msch Fsch PPPIα α α α α α ε− − − − −= + + + + + +  (4.1) 
 it i itε υ µ= +  (4.2) 
 0 6i iZα α α= +  (4.3) 
These are one-way error component regression models for our two categories of developing 
countries, LIDC and HIDC, where our dependent variable yit is per capita GNP growth for 
country i at time t. Git-1 is the income inequality coefficient (Gini) for country i at time t-1.  
Mschit-1 and Fschit-1 are male and female school enrollments, respectively, all drawn from the 
World's Bank WDI database. We also follow Forbes (2000) in including the price level of 
investment for country i at time t PPPIit-1 as a proxy for market distortions. In performing this 
type of analysis, one concern is the possibility of feedback from income inequality to growth if 
the regression is performed contemporaneously. Using lagged income inequality on the right-
hand side might ameliorate the endogeneity issue (see Temple 1999). It also allows us to assess 
the dynamic effects of income inequality on growth. 
 In the one-way error model of  (4.2), υi denotes the time-invariant and unobservable 
country-specific effects and μit  denotes the remaining unexplained disturbance with mean zero 
and variance-covariance 2 ntIνσ . iΖ  in (4.3) represents unobserved characteristics of the shifter 
parameter in (4.1).  
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Table 3 summarizes the regression results outlined by the system (4.1)-(4.3). Of foremost 
importance is the statistically significant estimates of the inequality coefficient. This table shows 
evidence that the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is in stark contrast 
between LIDCs and HIDCs. Increases in inequality seem to be positively related with economic 
growth in HIDCs. This result seems consistent with our theoretical framework if firms in HIDCs 
have generally higher levels of collateral or easier access to credit markets. Conversely, higher 
levels of income inequality seem detrimental to economic growth in LIDCs. This result is, at least 
in principle, consistent with the findings in Barro (2000) of a negative correlation between 
income inequality and economic growth in "poorer" countries.  
It can also be explained in the context of our theoretical hypothesis in Section 3. If LIDC 
economies are populated with firms that do not enjoy any meaningful levels of collateral, then 
they might be faced with little access to capital markets, which would have a deleterious effect on 
capital accumulation, and hence, economic growth.  
   
4.2 A Dynamic Model to Control for Persistence 
 Ignoring the importance of lagged dependent variables, when they are persistent, could 
lead to an omitted variable bias problem. Thus, we model a variant of (4.1)-(4.3) with all 
variables entering the model in first differences and where we regress our endogenous, economic 
growth qity , variable in a dynamic setting as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1q q q qit it it it it it it ity y y yβ λ ε ε− − − − −− = − + Χ − Χ + −  (4.4) 
where [ ],q HIDC LIDC∈ according to the World Bank Classification that was also employed in 
the previous section. The matrix of regressors Χ contains the gini ( )itG coefficient of income 
inequality, itMsch and itFsch as measures of male and female school enrollments, respectively, and the 
price level ( )itPPPI of investment.  
If there was substantial correlation present between the lagged dependent variables, the OLS 
estimator would be severely biased (Hsiao 2003) and exacerbated as the variance of the 
individual effects increases. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) describe an instrumental variable 
implementation that, in our context, involves choosing either 2
q
ity − or ( )2 3q qit ity y− −− as an 
instrument for ( )1 2q qit ity y− −− . However, Arellano and Bond (1991) point out that these (second 
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lags) are not the only two viable instruments. For our purposes any lag, beyond the second, may 
be uncorrelated with the error term while not necessarily uncorrelated with the lagged 
endogenous term. Arellano and Bond developed a procedure that treat the model as a system of 
equations, one for each period, where the matrix of differenced instruments is built recursively 
and estimated within a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach.6
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 Table 4 shows results of the (4.4) regression applied to two panels: one panel of 56 
countries classified as HIDCs by the World Bank, and a second panel of 55 countries classified as 
LIDC by the World Bank. Here again, the income inequality coefficient is negative for LIDC 
economies and positive for HIDC economies. Both estimates are statistically significant. Thus, 
the stark contrast, across income groups, in the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth seems robust to the degree of persistence in the variables of interest. 
Furthermore, all models thus far show that male and female school enrollments are significantly 
positively related to economic growth.7
 
 Finally, market distortions, as proxied by the price of 
investment, are negatively correlated with economic growth across all specifications. This result 
is consistent with findings in Perotti (1996), Forbes (2000), and others. 
4.3 An Endogenous Threshold Model 
 All results described thus far are based on the World Bank (2012) classification (outlined 
in Tables 1 and 2) of developing countries into 55 that fall in the category of  LIDCs, and 56 
countries classified as HIDCs. However, it could be argued that this classification may be 
somewhat arbitrary. For robustness, we consider a generalized threshold approach where we let 
the model find the measure of income that best fits the data. To that end we specify the following 
model of economic growth ( )ity for country i at period t that combines both types of country 
classification:  
 ( ) ( )HIDC LIDCit it it ity y I inc Y y I inc Y υ= > + < +    (4.5) 
                                                 
6 With this differenced-GMM approach the endogenous variable is properly instrumented with suitable lags of its own levels—other 
exogenous regressors and outside variables may enter the matrix of instrument in a standard way. However, with this differenced-
GMM Arellano-Bond estimator, the lag levels may be poor instruments for first differences in models (like ours)  in which highly 
persistent variables are considered. Thus, we opt to make use of an augmented version—a system-GMM approach—first described in 
Arellano and Bover (1995). For details on this estimation procedure, see Blundell and Bond (1998). We applied the XTABOND2 
procedure in STATA, which conducts a finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix to correct for the downward bias of 
the standard errors (Windmeijer 2005). 
7 This contrasts Forbes (2000) who finds a differential effect on economic growth between male and female school enrollment that 
looks sensitive to the econometric specification involved. 
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 Where Y is some income cutoff point for which the country is classified as a LIDC or a 
HIDC based on a generalized threshold approach following Hansen’s (1996, 2000) threshold 
procedure. This method searches over values of the threshold using conditional OLS regression 
based on a sequential search over all possibleY .8
 We then subdivide the sample and test for additional threshold levels. For the subsamples 
of observations that exceed the threshold level, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic was too 
small compared with the critical value. We conclude that no additional threshold levels are 
present. Our results on the economic growth relationship with income inequality seem supportive 
of the World's Bank notion that classifying developing countries as high income versus low-
income is warranted. According to results from equation (4.5), the estimated cutoff point for per 
capita income suggested by the data is $1,348. Our estimated threshold suggests a re-
classification from the World Bank's in Table 2 in which four countries (Algeria, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, and Paraguay) that were classified as LIDC according to World Bank are 
classified as HIDC according to our implied threshold. We re-estimate the dynamic panel model 
of (4.4) under this new classification. 
  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
All results of the dynamic panel approach under the estimated income threshold are 
qualitatively consistent with those of the dynamic panel under the World Bank classification. For 
robustness, we re-estimate the benchmark model of (4.1)-(4.3) with the income threshold, we 
endogenously estimated, as an alternative to taking the World Bank's threshold as given.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Qualitatively we get the same results in our benchmark model, whether we employ the 
threshold corresponding to the World Bank classification, or the one that our data set suggests. 
Overall, the results look robust to whether we employ the threshold employed by the 
World Banks or our own in all specifications we employ. The qualitative robustness of our results 
based on our endogenously estimated threshold suggests that the benchmark established by the 
World Bank seems a fair representation of developing economies, and one that would seem 
consistent with what the data suggests. 
 
                                                 
8 SinceY is not identified under a null hypothesis of “no-threshold effect,” the correlations are computed by a fixed 
bootstrap method where the bootstrap-dependent variable is generated from the OLS residual from the estimated 
threshold model. If the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, one can split up the original sample according to the 
estimated threshold value and then perform the same analysis on each subsample. This procedure is carried out 
sequentially until the null is no longer rejected in order to construct at least two groups. We apply Hansen’s test with 
10,000 bootstrap replications in a regression of economic growth in order to compute the p–values. The null hypothesis 
of no threshold can be decisively rejected regardless of specification (the p value for this test is less than 0.01). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Over the years there has been a plethora of studies that attempt to find an unequivocal picture on 
the question of whether income inequality is detrimental to long-term economic activity or whether it 
can enhance economic growth. A clear answer has remained elusive. A qualitative prediction seems 
sensitive to measurement and methodological choice. Much of the previous work on this topic was 
hampered by little availability of cross-country measures of inequality. This problem was especially 
salient in developing economies. Many empirical attacks that relied on OLS estimations of cross-
sections of developed economies have predicted a negative effect of income inequality on economic 
growth. Arguing that OLS may lead to biased results, the next step was to consider FE models with 
limited dynamics (5-year periods). This approach typically found a positive relationship between the 
inequality of developed economies and their economic growth.  
In an influential paper, Barro (2000) finds no relationship between those variables in developed 
economies. So the literature has spanned the full set of possible predictions: positive, negative,  or no 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. However, by combining developed and 
developing economies, Barro finds a stark contrast on the inequality-growth question. Our own 
results would seem consistent, at least in principle, with those. An important distinction in our 
contribution is that we focus exclusively on developing economies. These economies have routinely 
been ignored in the literature, but we argue that their importance to the world economy is not likely to 
dwindle (just the opposite) and, thus, the relevance of our question of inequality-growth in these 
countries is not likely to diminish either.  
The lack of consensus in the literature on a clear relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth could be an unintended consequence of imposing a basic linear structure (OLS, FE) 
on what could be a nonlinear relationship. So different predictions could arise from lending different 
structural interpretations to the same reduced-form evidence (Banerjee and Duflo 2003). We present 
in Section 3 a simple theoretical model that advances a relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth that is far from linear. That nonlinearity arises from credit market asymmetries 
among countries at different levels of income with ensuing differences in available collateral and 
access to credit markets. The data strongly supports the notion of building a case for nonlinearity. 
We regress economic growth on the Gini measure of income inequality in a panel of 55 LIDCs 
classified as such by the World Bank. Then, we conduct the same regression on a panel of 56 
countries classified as HIDCs by the World Bank. Following Perotti (1996), Forbes (2000), and 
others, we include education measures to proxy for human capital and a proxy for distortions on the 
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price of investment goods as explanatory variables in these regressions. Human capital measures have 
long been considered important explanatory variables in economic growth regressions. See Forbes 
(2000) for a comprehensive explanation for the inclusion of market distortion measures in these types 
of growth regressions. For our own context, market distortions on the price of investment goods could 
have distortionary effects on the valuation of collateral, which is the pillar with which we promote our 
nonlinear threshold approach in our theoretical framework.  
We find a positive relationship between income inequality and economic growth in HIDCs, 
which is in stark contrast with the negative relationship for LIDCs. We estimate an income threshold 
endogenously and re-estimate both regressions according to our own threshold. Importantly, the 
contrasting qualitative difference (between LIDC and HIDC) in the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth is robust whether we follow the World Bank's classification of 
developing economies or whether we classify them accordingly to what the data in our sample 
suggests.  
It could be argued that these results might be sensitive to the degree of persistence in the variables 
included in the regressions. Thus, we estimate variants of the benchmark regression with an Arellano-
Bond specification based on a GMM estimation of a recursive differencing approach. Qualitatively, 
all our results are robust to these alternative econometric techniques.  
Thus, our results are not sensitive to alternative threshold measurements or econometric 
specifications. Such robustness argues for the possibility that the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth is likely nonlinear. The avenue for nonlinearity we advance in this 
paper is a nonlinearity in the credit channel vis-a-vis national income. But other nonlinearities could 
prove to be just as important. For example, the correlation between income inequality and economic 
growth could be time variant even for specific cases of a single country. Another possibility is that the 
relationship could be asymmetric. For example, it could be the case that only reductions (but not 
increases) in inequality matter for economic growth—or vice versa. These are outside the scope of the 
paper but could prove informative for future empirical analysis.  
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Table 1: Low Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) 
per capita GNI ≤  US($) 1,035  
 
Economy Economy 
Algeria Iraq 
Angola Jamaica 
Bangladesh Kenya 
Bolivia Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Burkina Faso Lesotho 
Burundi Madagascar 
Cambodia Maldives 
Cameroon Mauritania 
Cape Verde Myanmar 
Central African Rep. Namibia 
Chad Nepal 
China Nigeria 
Colombia Pakistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Papua New Guinea 
Cuba Paraguay 
Djibouti Peru 
Dominican Republic Philippines 
Ecuador Samoa 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Senegal 
El Salvador Sierra Leone 
Gambia Sri Lanka 
Ghana Suriname 
Guatemala Swaziland 
Guinea-Bissau Syrian Arab Republic 
Haiti Tanzania 
Honduras Zambia 
India Zimbabwe 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  
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Table 2: High Income Developing Countries (HIDCs) 
per capita GNI > US($) 1,035 
 
Economy Economy 
American Samoa Mayotte 
Argentina Mexico 
Bahrain Montenegro 
Barbados Nicaragua 
Belize Northern Mariana Islands 
Botswana Oman 
Brazil Palau 
Bulgaria Panama 
Chile Peru 
Costa Rica Puerto Rico 
Croatia Qatar 
Cyprus Romania 
Dominica Russian Federation 
Equatorial Guinea Saudi Arabia 
Faeroe Islands Serbia 
French Polynesia Seychelles 
Gabon Slovak Rep. 
Granada Slovenia 
Guam South Africa 
Hungary St. Kitts and Nevis 
Israel St Lucia 
Kazahstan St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago 
Latvia Turkey 
Lebanon United Arab Emirates 
Libya Uruguay 
Malaysia Venezuela 
Mauritius Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
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Table 3: Benchmark Model -World Bank Classification (4.1)-(4.3) 
Dependent Variable: ( )ity Coefficient Economic Growth 
Variable LIDC HIDC 
 
1itG −  
 
 
 -0.066** 
(-2.02) 
 
 
 0.225** 
(2.14) 
1ity −  
 
0.212* 
(2.19) 
 
0.252* 
(2.92) 
1itMsch −  
 
0.080** 
(2.14) 
 
0.108** 
(2.07) 
1itFsch −  
 
 
0.008 
(1.24) 
 
 
0.013 
(1.61) 
 
1itPPPI −  
         -0.034** 
 (-2.05) 
 
    -0.089** 
         (-2.16) 
 R2 = 0.2346 
Std Error = 7.55 
DW-stat = 2.05 
P (F-stat) = 0.017 
R2 = 0.2986 
Std Error = 7.22 
DW-stat = 2.06 
P (F-stat) = 0.020 
T-values in parentheses. **indicates significance at 1%, *indicates significance at 5% 
 
 
Table 4: Dynamic Model -World Bank Classification (4.4) 
Dependent Variable: ( )ity∆ Coefficient Economic Growth 
Variable LIDC HIDC 
 
1itG −∆  
 
 
 -0.125** 
(-2.02) 
 
 
 0.182** 
(2.74) 
1itMsch −∆  
 
0.418** 
(2.85) 
 
0.521** 
(2.69) 
1itFsch −∆  
 
 
0.123** 
(2.45) 
 
 
0.381** 
(2.57) 
 
1itPPPI −∆  
         -0.474** 
 (-5.36) 
 
    -0.705** 
         (-6.22) 
 SGchi2(111)=221.4 
P>chi2=0.00 
N = 1,212 
H chi2(111)=33.24 
P>chi2=0.45 
SG chi2(116)=321.95 
P>chi2=0.00 
N = 1,928  
H chi2(116)=57.371 
P>chi2=0.34 
T-values in parentheses. **indicates significance at 1%, *indicates significance at 5% 
SG and H denote the Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions for the matrix of 
instruments for the System-GMM estimation procedure. 
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Table 5: Dynamic Model -Threshold-Implied  
                                             Classification (4.4)-(4.5) 
Dependent Variable: ( )ity∆ Coefficient Economic Growth 
Variable LIDC HIDC 
 
1itG −∆  
 
 
 -0.109** 
(-1.82) 
 
 
 0.182* 
(2.74) 
1itMsch −∆  
 
0.455* 
(1.81) 
 
0.521** 
(2.69) 
1itFsch −∆  
 
 
0.523* 
(1.83) 
 
 
0.381** 
(2.57) 
 
1itPPPI −∆  
         -0.203* 
 (-2.56) 
 
    -0.705* 
         (-2.57) 
 SGchi2(102)=393.53 
P>chi2=0.00 
N = 978 
H chi2(102)=55.24 
P>chi2=0.54 
SG chi2(118))=437.63 
P>chi2=0.00 
N = 2,162 
H chi2(118)=68.80 
P>chi2=0.49 
Notes: Same as above 
 
 
Table 6: Benchmark Model - Estimated Threshold (4.5) 
Dependent Variable: ( )ity Coefficient Economic Growth 
Variable LIDC HIDC 
 
1itG −  
 
 
 -0.161** 
(-2.17) 
 
 
 0.216** 
(2.34) 
1ity −  
 
0.146* 
(2.32) 
 
0.314* 
(2.78) 
1itMsch −  
 
0.091* 
(1.99) 
 
0.190* 
(2.08) 
1itFsch −  
 
 
0.011 
(1.34) 
 
 
0.014 
(1.47) 
 
1itPPPI −  
         -0.033** 
 (-2.11) 
 
    -0.163** 
         (-2.14) 
 R2 = 0.2662 
Std Error = 6.52 
DW-stat = 2.02 
P (F-stat) = 0.001 
R2 = 0.3185 
Std Error = 6.99 
DW-stat = 2.04 
P (F-stat) = 0.021 
T-values in parentheses. **indicates significance at 1%, *indicates significance at 5% 
 
